UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-6-2015

Doble v. Interstate Amusements, Inc. Respondent's
Brief Dckt. 42744

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Doble v. Interstate Amusements, Inc. Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42744" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5665.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5665

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
H. PETER DOBLE II, M.D., an
individual residing in the state of Idaho,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.

INTERS TA TE AMUSEMENTS, INC.,
an Idaho corporation,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
DOES 1-50, inclusive,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court Docket No. 42744-2014
Twin Falls County District Court Case No.
CV-2014-1419

)

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)
)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Twin Falls
Honorable Randy J. Stoker, District Judge, Presiding

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

Angelo L. Rosa (ISB #7546)
MARSH ROSA LLP
P.O. Box 1605
Boise, Idaho 83701

David W. Gadd (ISB #7605)
WORST, FITZGERALD & STOVER, PLLC
P.O. Box 1428
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1428

FIL D· COP
OCT O6 2015

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Table of Cases
I.

Authorities .................................................... .

11

. ..... 1

Statement of Case ............................ .
A. Nature of the Case

1

B. Statement of Facts and Procedural Background......

II.

.. ......................................... 1

Additional Issues on Appeal ............................................................................................. 6

III. Standard of Review ............... .........................................

............................................ 6

IV. Argument .................. ................ ............... ............. .......... .. ..
A

.......................................... 6

Doble Waived His Right to Appeal by Voluntarily Initiating Negotiations, and
Ultimately Agreeing to, a Payment Schedule Relative to the Amount of the
Amended Judgment.......................................................
. ..... 6

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Awarding Interstate Its Attorney's
Fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121. .............................................................................. 9
C.

V.

Interstate Is Entitled to an Award oflts Attorney's Fees on Appeal Pursuant to
..................................
...................................... 14
Idaho Code § 12-121. .........

Conclusion

BRIEF

.................................................

14

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Cases
A/mack v.
P.3d 452 (Kans. 2010) ..................................
7
Camp v. unu-,1::,,.
Idaho 878, 693 P.2d 1080 (Ct. App. 1984)
...... 9
Citifinancial Jvfortgage Co. v. Clark, 177 P.3d 986 (Kans. 2008).....
. ..... 7
Motor Co., 206 P .3d 1 (Kans. Ct. App. 2009)
...... 7
Hemphill v.
Lower Payette Ditch Co. v. Harvey, 152 Idaho 291,271 P.3d 689 (2012) ........................................ 14
Matter of Estate oflvfcGurrin, 113 Idaho 341, 743 P.2d 994 (Ct. App. 1987) ............................ 11, 12
Ore-Ida Potato Products, Inc. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 87 Idaho 1854, 392 P.2d 191 (1964) .......... 13
People ex rel. Neilson v. Wilkins, 101 Idaho 394, 614 P.2d 417 (1980) .............................................. 7
Rae v. Bunce, 145 Idaho 798, 186 P.3d 654 (2008) .......................................................................... 6, 9
Roark v. Bentley, 139 Idaho 793, 86 P.3d 507 (2004) .......................................................................... 9
State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 275 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2012) .......................................... 12
Vap v. Diamond Oil Producers, Inc., 671 P.2d 1126 (Kans. Ct. App. 1983)
7

Statutes
Idaho Code§ 12-121 ........................................................................ .

Rules
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(5) ......................................................... .
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 ..................................................................... .

1, 9, 13, 14

.... 14
.... 14

I.
A.

STATEMENT OF CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of the trial court's decision to award attorney's fees against the plaintiff

under Idaho Code§ 12-121 based upon its finding that the plaintiff brought and pursued his
action against the defendant frivolously and unreasonably. In his Complaint for Damages, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant's issuance and use of paper vouchers-each of which bore a
date upon which the voucher expired-violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. However, as
the trial court noted, the plaintiff failed to provide any facts or legal argument that were based
upon the provisions of the Act, electing instead to rely almost exclusively upon the statutes of
other jurisdictions.
B.

STATEMENTOFFACTSANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND
At the times relevant to this action, the defendant, Interstate Amusements, Inc.

("Interstate"), was the owner and operator of a number of movie theaters in the Magic Valley
region. R Vol. I, p. 4 7. As part of its business, Interstate marketed and sold vouchers, or gift
certificates, denominated as "Cinema Cash." Id. Issued in paper form only, Cinema Cash was
printed in $1.00 increments and could be used solely toward the price of admission to movies
shown at and concessions sold in Interstate's various theater locations. Id. Prominently displayed
on the face of each Cinema Cash voucher is an expiration date, which provides the date by which
the voucher must be redeemed. Id.
In approximately mid-December 2013, the plaintiff in this action, H. Peter Doble II, M.D.
("Doble"), attempted to redeem a Cinema Cash voucher that had expired nearly twelve months
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prior. Id. at pp. 52, 102. When Doble attempted to redeem the expired voucher, the ticket booth
employee informed Doble that Interstate would be unable to accept the voucher due to the fact
that it had expired. Id. at p. 102. Despite Doble's efforts to persuade the employee to accept the
expired voucher, the employee ultimately did not. Id. at p. 103.
Doble initiated this action by filing a Complaint for Damages on March 28, 2014,
wherein he alleged three separate causes of action. R Vol. I, pp. 8-14. The first and second
causes of action each allege violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, Idaho Code § 48601 et seq. (the "Act") and seek both money damages and injunctive relief. Id. Doble's third
cause of action seeks declaratory relief pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1201 et seq. Id. The
Complaint for Damages also states an intention to seek class certification, though such
certification was never pursued. Id. at pp. 11, 180. Additionally, Doble included in his prayer for
relief a claim of punitive damages, despite his neither requesting nor receiving leave from the
trial court to seek such damages. Id. at pp. 15, 180.
On May 12, 2014, following the initiation of written discovery, Interstate filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment. R Vol. I, p. 37. Doble responded by filing Plaintiff's Response to
Defendant Interstate Amusement, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-motion for
Summary Judgment on May 22, 2014. Id. at p. 89. In the section of his memorandum supporting
his cross-motion, Doble argued that he was entitled to summary judgment on his three causes of
action based not upon Idaho law, but rather upon various statutes enacted by the legislatures of
eight other states, which specifically and expressly prohibit the expiration of gift certificates. Id.
at pp. 94-96. Notwithstanding the substantial and material differences between those statutes and
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the Act, Doble contended that the trial court should interpret the Act to proscribe the use of gift
vouchers bearing expiration dates Idaho. Id.
The Act itself is referenced only four (4) times in Doble' s argument in support of his
cross-motion:
Y "First, not only is this the sort of nonsensical business practice that the Act

was intended to prevent, the laws of other sister jurisdictions also address this
issue." R Vol. I, p. 94.
Y "Accordingly, the laws of sister-jurisdictions provide this Court with an

excellent frame of reference with which to render a ruling on the applicability
of the Act to the facts of the present case." Id. at p. 95
Y "Second, the facts identified in Section II, supra, create a clear statement of

undisputed facts to which this Court must apply the law, using both the
existing Act and the other sources of legal authority available to this Court."
Id.
};;, "Converting currency into 'cash' that can only be used in one business and
only for a dictated period of time is an unfair abbreviation of the use of that
cash and is, within the context of the Act, an unlawful business practice." Id.
at p. 96.
Doble did not provide any explanation or analysis as to why the expiration of Cinema Cash was
unlawful under the Act. See id. at pp. 89-97.
At the hearing on the parties' respective motions for summary judgment, the trial court
orally granted Interstate's motion for summary judgment and denied Doble's cross-motion. 1 Tr
Vol. I, pp. 27-28. Shortly thereafter, the trial court entered a Judgment dismissing Doble's

1 It is unclear from the evidence in the record whether Doble purchased the voucher at issue or acquired it as a gift
or promotional item. See Tr Vo I. I, p. 24, L. 10-17. However, based upon the serial number on the voucher,
Interstate was able to determine that the voucher was issued during the latter half of 2010. R Vol. I, p. 47-48.
However, the trial court accepted an offer of proof from Doble's counsel that Doble had, in fact, purchased the
voucher and assumed that fact to be true for purposes of summary judgment. Tr Vol. I, p. 24, L. 9-17.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF I Page 3

claims with prejudice. R Vol. I, p. 139. Doble has not appealed the trial court's decision to grant
summary judgment in Interstate's favor or the entry of the Judgment.
Interstate subsequently filed a Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs, whereby it
sought an award of attorney's fees pursuant to, among other statutes, Idaho Code§ 12-121. ld. at
p. 141. Doble filed an objection to Interstate's Memorandum, arguing that an award of attorney's
fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 would be improper and that the amount of fees sought by
Interstate was unreasonable. Id. at pp. 149-50. At the hearing on Doble 's objection, the parties
stipulated to submit the issue to the trial court without oral argument, whereupon the trial court
took the matter under advisement. Tr Vol. I, pp. 31-32, 34.
On October 14, 2014, the trial court issued its Memorandum Opinion Re Defendant's
Claim for Costs and Attorney Fees, wherein the court awarded Interstate's attorney's fees under
Idaho Code§ 12-121 in the amount of $7,972.50. R Vol. I, pp. 173-82. In reaching its decision,
the trial court noted that
the entire premise of[Doble's] claim is based upon statutes of other states which
have placed restrictions on gift certificates. Idaho has no such legislative
enactments. Nor does Idaho have any case law from which a credible argument
could be made to permit this cause of action. This case was premised upon the
Idaho Consumer Protection Act. That Act lists a considerable number of examples
of statutory violations, however, none of them cover the conduct alleged in this
case. Thus, Plaintiff was required to prove that the Cinema Cash program would
"outrage or offend the public conscience." LC. § 48-603C(2)(d). Yet no evidence
or credible argument supported that claim.

Id. at p. 180. Recognizing that misrepresentation is the heart of consumer protection violations,
the triai court aiso found that Doble "failed to offer any evidence of misrepresentation of the
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program to the public. To the contrary, the evidence suggests that the Cinema Cash vouchers
clearly advised voucher holders of the expiration date." Id. at p. 179 (emphasis in original).
In accordance with its memorandum opinion, the trial court entered an Amended
Judgment on October 17, 2014, which provided, in pertinent part, that "(t]he defendant, Interstate
Amusements, Inc., shall recover from the plaintiff costs in the amount of $320.44 and attorney's
fees in the amount of $7,972.50, for a total of $8,292.94." Id. at p. 184.
Three days later, Doble's counsel sent an email to Interstate's counsel, wherein he stated,
"My client wishes to pay the judgment off in 12 equal monthly installments .... If your client is
willing to proceed forward with this payment plan, I will draw up a very brief confirming letter
that can be countersigned. This offer will remain open until 5:00 p.m. Mountain Time this
coming Friday, 24 October 2014." Id. at p. 199. Prior to Interstate's counsel's receipt of this
email, Interstate had not solicited or made any offers to accept payments on the Amended
Judgment, nor had Interstate taken any action to enforce the Amended Judgment. Id. at pp. 23839, ,-i 2. Interstate's counsel responded the following day, stating that Interstate was willing to
accept payments over six months, rather than twelve months, and, provided payments were made
on time, would forego any collection efforts. Id. at p. 200. On November 5, 2014, Doble's
counsel advised that his client "might be able to do 9 months, but no less." Id. at p. 201.
Interstate accepted this schedule, with the first payment due November 10, 2014, and prepared a
letter confirming the same pursuant to Doble's counsel's request. Id. at pp. 202-06.
In accordance with the parties' agreement, Interstate did not take any action to execute on
the Amended Judgment. Id. at p. 240. Unfortunately, however, Doble did not make the first

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF I Page 5

payment as scheduled, and on November 13, 2014, Interstate's counsel sent Doble's counsel an
email asking when payment may be expected. R Vol. I, pp. 197, 208. After receiving no
response, Interstate's counsel followed up again with Doble's counsel on November 19, 2014,
stating that if payment was not received by November 24, 2014, along with written assurances
that all future payments would be timely made, then Interstate would proceed with collection
efforts. Id. at p. 208. Doble's counsel responded later that day, "ask[ing] for continued patience"
and representing that he had "forwarded [Interstate's counsel's] message to [Doble] with
instructions to make the first payment." Id. at p. 209. However, instead of making the promised
payment by November 24, 2014, Doble filed a Notice of Appeal.
II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

A Whether Doble waived his right to appeal by voluntarily initiating negotiations
concerning, and ultimately agreeing to, a payment schedule relative to the judgment
amount.

R Whether Interstate is entitled to attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-121.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Idaho Supreme Court reviews a trial court's award of attorney fees under Idaho Code
§ 12-121 under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Rae v. Bunce, 145 Idaho 798,805, 186 P.3d 654,
661 (2008).
IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

DOBLE WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL BY VOLUNTARILY INITIATING
NEGOTIATIONS, AND ULTIMATELY AGREEING TO, A PAYMENT SCHEDULE
RELATIVE TO THE AMOUNT OF THE AMENDED JUDGMENT.
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Preliminary to the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion is the issue of
whether Doble has waived his right to appeal this matter. Interstate respectfully submits that he
has by virtue of his voluntary agreement to pay the amount of the Amended Judgment over a
period of nine (9) months. "It is a matter of law that a party who does ·anything which savors of
acquiescence in a judgment cuts off the right of appellate review."' People ex rel. Neilson v.

Wilkins, 101 Idaho 394,396,614 P.2d 417,419 (1980) (quoting Iseman v. Kansas Gas & Elec.
Co., 567 P.2d 856, 862 (Kan. 1977)). "The doctrine of acquiescence is based on the
inconsistency between accepting [the] burden from a judgment while appealing the judgment
itself." Almack v. Steeley, 230 P.3d 452,456 (Kans. 2010).
"Acquiescence occurs when a party voluntarily complies with all or part of a judgment."

Id. For example, an appellant was deemed to have acquiesced to a judgment, thereby waiving its
right to appeal, when it voluntarily paid the attorney's fees awarded against it. Wilkins, IOI Idaho
at 396, 614 P.2d at 419. A judgment creditor who accepted payment of an arbitration award was
precluded from appealing the propriety of the award. Hemphill v. Ford Motor Co., 206 P.3d 1, 4
(Kans. Ct. App. 2009). A judgment debtor was held to have acquiesced to the judgment entered
against it by simply allowing or permitting the judgment to be satisfied by execution. Vap v.

Diamond Oil Producers, Inc., 671 P .2d 1126, 1129 (Kans. Ct. App. 1983 ); but see Citifinancial
Mortgage Co. v. Clark, 177 P.3d 986 (Kans. 2008) (noting that the mere failure to stay execution
of the judgment by filing a supersedeas bond does not constitute acquiescence).
Following the entry of the Amended Judgment in this case, Doble voluntarily assumed
the burden of paying the attorney's fees and costs awarded against him when he, through
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counsel, offered and ultimately agreed to make payments toward the Amended Judgment in
exchange for Interstate's agreement to forbear executing on the same. On October 20, 2014,
Doble's attorney initiated negotiations in this regard by sending an email to Interstate's counsel,
stating, "My client wishes to pay the judgment off in 12 equal monthly installments." R Vol. I, p.
242. Prior to Interstate's counsel's receipt of this email, Interstate had not solicited or made any
offers to accept payments on the Amended Judgment, nor had Interstate taken any action to
enforce the Amended Judgment. Id. at pp. 238-39. After some negotiation, the parties ultimately
agreed that Doble would pay the amount of the Amended Judgment over a period of nine
months. Id. at pp. 243-45. By so doing, Doble voluntarily accepted and assumed the burden of
paying the amount of attorney's fees and costs awarded to Interstate by the Amended Judgment
In accordance with the parties' agreement, Interstate did not take any action to execute on
the Amended Judgment. R Vol. I, p. 240. When Doble failed to make timely payment in
accordance with the payment schedule, his counsel asked "for some continued patience," stating
that he had "forwarded [the] message to [Doble] with instructions to make the first payment." Id.
at p. 252. By this statement, Doble again acknowledges his agreement to make monthly
payments toward the Amended Judgment.
By agreeing to pay the amount of the Amended Judgment over time, Doble voluntarily
acquiesced to the Amended Judgment and, in so doing, waived his right to appeal the trial court's
award of attorney's fees. This Court should so hold and affirm the trial court's award on that
basis. To hold otherwise would deprive Interstate of any remedy for Doble's breach of contract
and may encourage future litigants to similarly breach such forbearance agreements.
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B.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING
INTERSTATE ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER IDAHO CODE§ 12-121.
As set forth, above, this Court reviews a decision to award attorney's fees pursuant to

Idaho Code§ 12-121 under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Rae v. Bunce, 145 Idaho 798, 805,
186 P .3d 654, 661 (2008). Absent an abuse of that discretion, the appellate court cannot overturn
the trial court's award of attorney's fees. Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878,884,693 P.2d 1080,
1086 (Ct. App. 1984).
To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court considers:
( 1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
Roark v. Bentley, 139 Idaho 793, 798, 86 P .3d 507, 512 (2004 ).

It appears from Appellant's Opening Brief that Doble does not dispute that the trial court
correctly perceived the issue of whether to award fees under section 12-121 as one of discretion.
Indeed, "This Court has said repeatedly that an award of attorney fees under I. C. § 12-121 is
within the broad and sound discretion of the trial court." Id. at 797-98, 86 P.3d at 511-12. The
trial court expressly acknowledged this standard in its Memorandum Opinion. R Vol. I, p. 170.
Doble also appears to recognize that the trial court was authorized to determine, and did
determine, whether Doble brought or pursued claims without having any basis for such claims in
law or in fact and, if so, whether to award attorney's fees to Interstate and the amount of such
award if it found. Accordingly, there is no contention that the trial court acted within the
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards. Thus, the subject of
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this Court's review is whether the trial court reached its decision to award fees against Doble by
an exercise of reason.
In this regard, Doble seeks to focus the Court's attention on a single statement made by
the trial court at the hearing on his objection to Interstate's memorandum of costs, namely, "It's
memorable because this is a case over$ L" Tr VoL I, p. 32, L 13-14. The context of that
statement indicates that the trial court was simply notifying counsel that it was familiar with and
did not require a full recitation of the facts of this case. However, Doble uses this statement, in
isolation, to springboard to the unfounded conclusion that the trial court "minimized the intent
behind Dr. Doble's lawsuit, saying in essence that because Interstate was depriving its customer
of such a small amount of money, $1.00 at a time, to complain about such a practice is frivolous
by nature." Appellant's Opening Br., p. 7.
In truth, the trial court acknowledged the opposite, noting that "[m]any cases in this
country have achieved desirable social goals even though the amount of money at issue may
have been considered de minimis." R Vol. I, p. 179. The trial court further stated that although
this case involved "a nominal money claim ... , [t]hat factor, in and of itself, is not a reason to
award fees under I. C. § 12-121." Id ( emphasis in original). The trial court continued, however,
stating that "if the litigation is not supported by both law and fact, then a case can be both
frivolous and unreasonable. This is such a case." Id. at p. 180.
As pled in his Complaint for Damages, Doble's claims are based upon alleged violations
of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, Idaho Code§ 48-601 et seq. (the "Act"). However,
throughout the proceedings before the trial court, Doble made only cursory and conclusory
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references to the Act. For example, in his written argument in support of his cross-motion for
summary judgment, Doble did not provide any analysis of, quote, or even cite the text of the Act
itself. In fact, the Act is referenced only four (4) times in his argument in support of his crossmotion:
~

"First, not only is this the sort of nonsensical business practice that the Act
was intended to prevent, the laws of other sister jurisdictions also address this
issue." R VoL I, p. 94.

~

"Accordingly, the laws of sister-jurisdictions provide this Court with an
excellent frame of reference with which to render a ruling on the applicability
of the Act to the facts of the present case." Id. at p. 95

~

"Second, the facts identified in Section II, supra, create a clear statement of
undisputed facts to which this Court must apply the law, using both the
existing Act and the other sources oflegal authority available to this Court."
Id.

',, "Converting currency into 'cash' that can only be used in one business and
only for a dictated period of time is an unfair abbreviation of the use of that
cash and is, within the context of the Act, an unlawful business practice." Id.
at p. 96.
At no point did Doble provide any explanation, analysis, or argument as to how the facts that he
had alleged in his Complaint gave rise to a valid claim against Interstate under the provisions of
the Act.
Instead, Doble relied upon "the existence of laws of sister jurisdictions" as the basis for
his claim. Doble argued that, in accordance with the precedent authorizing Idaho courts to
"consider the decisions of courts in other jurisdictions where statutes containing similar language
have been construed," R. VoL I, p. 95 (quoting 1vfatter of Estate of McGurrin, 113 Idaho 341,
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347, 743 P.2d 994, 1000 (Ct. App. 1987)), the trial court should interpret the Act to prohibit the
expiration of gift certificates, similar to those prohibitions enacted by legislatures in other states.
While it is indisputable that Idaho courts have considered the decisions of courts in other
jurisdictions in the past, such consideration has been limited to "decisions of courts"-not
legislatively enacted statutes-and only those decisions "where statutes containing similar
language [to the Idaho statute at issue] have been construed." McGurrin, 113 Idaho at 347, 743
P.2d at 1000; see also State v. }vfartinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 784, 275 P.3d 1, 10 (Ct. App.
2012). The trial court appropriately found Doble's argument unpersuasive, not because it "failed
to grasp the legitimacy of Dr. Doble's claims," as Doble argues, but because "a consumer
protection violation is predicated on a legislative enactment and it is therefore not proper to use
foreign legislation to expand the meaning of this law." R Vol. I, p. 178.
The trial court further noted that
the entire premise of [Doble's] claim is based upon statutes of other states which
have placed restrictions on gift certificates. Idaho has no such legislative
enactments. Nor does Idaho have any case law from which a credible argument
could be made to permit this cause of action. This case was premised upon the
Idaho Consumer Protection Act. That Act lists a considerable number of examples
of statutory violations, however, none of them cover the conduct alleged in this
case. Thus, Plaintiff was required to prove that the Cinema Cash program would
"outrage or offend the public conscience." LC. § 48-603C(2)( d). Yet no evidence
or credible argument supported that claim.

Id. at p. 180 (emphasis added).
Noting that misrepresentation is the heart of consumer protection violations, the trial
court also found that Dobie "failed to offer any evidence of misrepresentation of the program to
the public. To the contrary, the evidence suggests that the Cinema Cash vouchers clearly advised
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voucher holders of the expiration date." Id. at p. 179 (emphasis in original). Doble failed to
provide any evidence that would support a claim under the Act, electing instead to rely upon the
laws of other jurisdictions, despite the clear and basic "rule, universally reiterated," that "no law,
statute, or otherwise has any force or effect of its own beyond the limits of the sovereignty from
which its authority is derived." Ore-Ida Potato Products, Inc. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 87 Idaho
185,194,392 P.2d 191, 196 (1964) (citing 15 C.J.S. Conflict of Laws§ 3, p. 833 (1939)).
The trial court also found that Doble's tactics of pleading an intention of maintaining a
class action, but failing to pursue certification, and pleading a claim of punitive damages, despite
the clear statutory requirement that a party first obtain leave of the court, "could be construed as
constituting harassment, and they are also certainly within the definition of frivolous conduct
contemplated by the statute." R Vol. I, p. 180. Based upon the entirety of the record before it, the
trial court found that it was "left with the abiding belief that this action was brought frivolously,
unreasonably, and without foundation" and that attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121 were
appropriate.
As outlined, above, and as demonstrated in its written opinion, the trial court did not
reach its decision to award attorney's fees arbitrarily or whimsically. Rather, it considered
carefully the claims pled by Doble, the evidence submitted by the parties, and the legal
arguments and authority cited by counsel. The trial court's memorandum reflects a thoughtful
and reasoned approach to the issue of whether to award attorney's fees, and it cannot be said that
the triai court abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to Interstate. Accordingly, this
Court should affirm the trial court's decision in this regard.
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C.

INTERSTATE IS ENTITLED TO AN AW ARD OF ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES ON
APPEAL PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE§ 12-121.
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 35(b)(5) and 41, Interstate respectfully requests an

award of its reasonable attorney's fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-121. This Court has
held that attorney's fees under section 12-121 are appropriate when a party "ask[s] [the Court] to
second-guess the district court's exercise of discretion without presenting any reasoned argument
from which [the Court] could conclude that the district court abused its discretion .... " Lower
Payette Ditch Co. v. Harvey, 152 Idaho 291,297, 271 P.3d 689,695 (2012).
As demonstrated by Interstate's argument, above, and by a reading of Appellant's
Opening Brief, Doble has failed to present any rational argument to support its contention that
the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Interstate its attorney's fees. Indeed, much of
Appellant's Opening Brief is spent arguing, in effect, that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment by failing to give deference to the statutes of other states, an issue that is not
before this Court on appeal. Doble failed to present any evidence or authority to support his
claims and arguments below, and he has failed to do so again on appeal. Therefore, Interstate
respectfully submits that it is entitled to an award of its attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code§
12-121.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth, above, Interstate respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
trial court's award of attorney's fees on the grounds that Doble has waived his right to appeal the
issue and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining an award of attorney's
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fees was appropriate under Idaho Code § 12-121. Additionally, Interstate requests that this Court
award Interstate its attorney's fees incurred in connection with this appeal.
DATED this 6th day of October, 2015.
WORST, FITZGERALD

By:

& STOVER, PLLC

~
David W. Gadd
Attorneys for Respondent
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